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Abstract
I introduce a property of players valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post e¢ cient
equilibrium in asymmetric English auctions. The use of this property has the advantage of
yielding an ex post e¢ cient equilibrium without assuming di¤erentiability of valuations or that
signals are drawn from a density. These technical, non economic, assumptions have been ubiq-
uitous in the study of (potentially) asymmetric English auctions. Therefore, my work highlights
the economic content of what it takes to obtain e¢ cient ex post equilibria.
I generalize prior work by Echenique and Manelli (2006) and by Birulin and Izmalkov (2003).
Relative to Krishna (2003), I weaken his single crossing properties, drop his di¤erentiability and
densities assumptions, but I assume that one players valuation is weakly increasing in other
playerssignals, while he uses a di¤erent assumption (neither stronger nor weaker).
Journal of Economic Literature Classication Numbers: D44, D82
Keywords: Auctions, E¢ ciency, Ex-post Equilibrium
1 Introduction
This paper gives a minimal set of assumptions that ensures existence of an e¢ cient ex-post equilib-
rium (once signals are known, players dont want to change their behavior), in asymmetric English
auctions. I introduce a new assumption that I call Own E¤ect Property, and a new method to nd
equilibria, that does not require the ubiquitous assumptions that value functions are di¤erentiable
I thank Federico Echenique and Alejandro Manelli for their comments. This paper started as an attempt to
weaken some of the assumptions in their paper Echenique and Manelli (2006) on comparative statics. This paper
owes them a lot: the main property of this paper is a weak version of their Dominant E¤ect Property, and the method
of proof that I use was rst used in an earlier version of their paper.
yCorrespondence address : Universidad de Montevideo, Prudencio de Pena 2440, Montevideo, 11600, Uruguay.
Email: dubraj@um.edu.uy and jdubra@utdt.edu
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and that signals are drawn from a density. Moreover, the Own E¤ect Property is weaker than all
the versions of the single crossing property that have been used in this branch of the literature.
The contribution of this paper is important because the English auction has had a prominent
role in allocating objects among a potential set of buyers, both in real life, and in economic theory.
The English was the rst auction format, having been used since the times of the Roman empire,
and it is the most commonly used form of auction to sell goods nowadays (see McAfee and McMillan
(1987) and Cassady (1967) who claims that 75% or more of all auctions are English). Its popularity
stems from a variety of reasons: it yields more revenue than the other common auction format, the
sealed bid, in a variety of contexts (see Milgrom (1989) and Milgrom and Weber, 1982); it allocates
the object e¢ ciently in a wider range of environments; and it economizes on information gathering
and bid preparation costs (see Milgrom, 1989). Also, relative to other theoretical constructions of
reduced use in the real world, like the second-price auction, it does not require the winner to reveal
his true valuation, thus avoiding renegotiation between the seller and the highest bidder and also
avoiding any conict that could happen if (for example) in a second-price auction the price paid is
signicantly less than what the winning bidder stated he was willing to pay. Finally, in a variety of
contexts the English Auction has an ex post equilibrium, one which remains an equilibrium even
if bidders know each othersvaluations or signals. If this is the equilibrium actually played, then
players have no ex-post regrets, or reasons to renegotiate, making the auction format attractive.
Also, Perry and Reny (2005) have argued that
Simultaneous (sealed-bid) auction formats, we contend, often require participants to
collect and provide signicant amounts of redundant information. For example, the
remarkable e¢ cient auction due to Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) requires a bidder to
submit to the auctioneer his entire preference prole (over all possible bundles of goods)
for all possible vectors of signals of the other bidders. Consequently, the vast majority
of information a bidder is required to express is redundant since the only relevant
preference prole is that corresponding to the actual realized vector of signals of the
others. Perry and Renys (2002) auction also requires bidders to submit large amounts
of redundant information (...) However, given the actual vector of bidder signals, most
of these as ifcomparisons are not required to determine the e¢ cient outcome.
They go on to argue that this excessive amount of information gathering may make bidders col-
lect less relevant information about the actual state of the world, leading to an ine¢ cient allocation
of the object.
To summarize, I present a simple assumption of payo¤ functions that is weaker than all the
assumptions of its kind, that ensures the existence of an e¢ cient ex-post equilibrium in the Asym-
metric English Auction, when one assumes that valuations are non decreasing. This new assumption
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allows us to work with valuations that are not di¤erentiable, and with types which are not drawn
from densities. The method of proof, rst presented in Echenique and Manelli (2006), is new and
highlights the economic content of the assumptions that ensure e¢ ciency in this kind of auctions.
This contribution is relevant, because English auctions have played a prominent role in real life,
and in economic theory.
I will now present the model, the assumptions and the results. I postpone the discussion of
the literature until Section 3, because it needs a series of denitions. It su¢ ces here to say that
the paper most related to this is Krishna (2003). Although he uses di¤erentiability, densities, and
two single crossing conditions that are stronger than the one in this paper, his set of su¢ cient
conditions for the existence of e¢ cient ex-post equilibria in Asymmetric English Auctions does not
imply my assumptions, since I assume that when some players valuations are tied, valuations are
weakly increasing in other playerssignals. This assumption is neither weaker nor stronger than
his assumption that one signals increase causes the sum of valuations to increase.
2 The Model and Main Results
Let N = f1; 2:::; ng be the set of players. Each player i observes a signal si 2 [0; b]. This signal is
only known to player i: Signals are drawn according to some probability measure  over [0; b]n that
need not posses a density. The signals a¤ect the values that players have for the objects. Player
is valuation is a continuous function vi : [0; b]
n ! R that maps proles of signals (one for each
player) into real numbers, and that is strictly increasing in its own signal, so that for all i and all
s i (vectors are written in bold) in [0; b]n 1 ; s0i > si implies vi (s
0
i; s i) > vi (si; s i). For any s;
let W (s) be the set of players i such that vi (s)  vk (s) for all k (the set of winnersat s). Let
jW (s)j be the cardinality of W (s) : I now introduce the two conditions that are su¢ cient for the
existence of an e¢ cient equilibrium.
Denition. The set of functions v is Increasing at Ties if for every s such that jW (s)j > 1 and
all i 2W (s)
s0  s
s0j > sj if and only if j 2 P (s0; s) W (s)
)
) vi
 
s0i; s
0
 i
  vi  s0i; s i :
The interpretation of the above property is as follows. Suppose s is a prole of signals for which
at least two players have equal and highest valuations. Then, the property requires that if one of
the winners signal increases to s0i; then the e¤ect of the other players signals, when they increase
from s i to s0 i; does not hurt player i: Example 6 of Maskin (2001) shows that even if some sort
of single crossing property is satised, one still needs that player js signal does not a¤ect player
is valuation very negatively, if an e¢ cient equilibrium is to exist (an equilibrium is e¢ cient
if it always allocates the object to one of the players with the highest valuation). Valuations in
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Maskins example are not Increasing at Ties, and that is why he nds that no e¢ cient equilibrium
exists. This property is neither weaker nor stronger than Krishnas assumption that when is signal
increases, the sum of all players valuations increases.
I now turn to the more substantial assumption on valuations.
Denition. The set of functions v satises the Own E¤ect Property (OEP) if for every s such that
jW (s)j > 1 it happens that
s0  s
s0j > sj if and only if j 2 P (s0; s) W (s)
)
) max
j2P (s0;s)
vj
 
s0
  max
k=2P (s0;s)
vk
 
s0

It states that the e¤ect of an increase in some signals is larger for one of the players whose signal
increased than for all the rest of the players. Notice that it is a form of single crossing: if there are
only two players, js valuation is equal to ks and js signal increases, js valuation is larger than
ks. As will be shown later, it is the weakest form of single crossingthat has been used in this
branch of the literature.
This paper is concerned with the irrevocable exit English Auction introduced by Milgrom and
Weber (1982). In this game the auctioneer continuously raises the asking price, starting from
zero. A bidder has the option of quitting the auction publicly at any time, and once he quits,
he cannot reenter. The winner is the last bidder to remain in the auction, and he pays the price
called when the last player (other than him) left the auction. In this game, a strategy for a
player is a function that determines a price at which to quit, for each realization of the private
information, and each history of who left the auction at what price. Formally, a strategy for
bidder i is a collection of functions, one for each set of (active) players A and each prole pNnA of
prices at which bidders in NnA quit the auction, Ai : [0; b] RNnA+ ! R+ where i 2 A; jAj > 1
and Ai
 
si;p
NnA > max fpj : j 2 NnAg : The value Ai  si;pNnA is the price at which bidder
i will drop out if players in NnA dropped at prices pNnA and nobody quits before. As long as
p < Ai
 
si;p
NnA he stays in the auction; he drops out when p = Ai  si;pNnA ; in any history in
which p > Ai
 
si;p
NnA he drops out (this part of the strategy will never be used).
The following is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1. Suppose that v is increasing at ties and satises the OEP. Then, there is an e¢ cient
ex post equilibrium.
Versions of the previous Theorem have appeared elsewhere. The contribution of this paper lies
in the relaxation of several of the assumptions generally made to obtain the results. I now discuss
the relation of my assumptions with those that have appeared before in the literature.
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2.1 Necessity
I will show that, if one assumes a certain regularity condition on the valuations, then the OEP is
necessary for existence of e¢ cient equilibria in undominated strategies.
So far we have said that an equilibrium is e¢ cient if it allocates the object to one of the
players with the highest valuation for all proles of signals. This denition of e¢ ciency is the most
demanding if one is concerned with nding su¢ cient conditions for the existence of an e¢ cient
equilibrium. But one could also use another denition of e¢ ciency which is more demanding for
necessity, and less so for su¢ ciency. Let us say that if an equilibrium of the English auction
(with valuations v and distribution of signals ) assigns the object to the highest bidder with
 probability 1 it is  e¢ cient.
Suppose now that we want to prove a theorem like If property P of the prole of valuations
v is violated, then there is no  e¢ cient equilibrium for any : There is no hope for such a
Theorem, because if we assume vi (0) = 0 for all i and set  (0) = 1; then any strategy prole that
has Ni (0; ;) = 0 (all players quit at p = 0; when all players are active, if they have a signal of 0)
is a  e¢ cient equilibrium. Hence, the statement of the would-be theorem should be If property
P of the prole of valuations v is violated, then there is a  such that no  e¢ cient equilibrium
exists.
I say that the set of functions v is regular if each vi is twice di¤erentiable and for all s with
jW (s)j > 1 the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of subsets of the winners is invertible, or
more formally, for all P W (s) ;
DP v (s) =

@vi (s)
@sj

i;j2P
is invertible.
I now show that in the presence of the regularity assumption above, the OEP is necessary.
For simplicity, and because the focus of this paper is precisely to get rid of the di¤erentiability
assumptions, I present the result for only three players.1 With more players the arguments are
more involved, but the result is still true. I also assume that if two or more players quit at the
same price, the tie is broken assigning the object to each player with positive probability.2
Theorem 2. Necessity of the OEP. Suppose there are three players and that the valuations v
are regular. If v does not satisfy the OEP at some interior s and s0 with s0 > s; there is a  such
that no  e¢ cient equilibrium in undominated strategies exists.
1 I also assume that the equilibrium is undominated, as has been previously done for this kind of auction in Perry
and Reny (2005) and Maskin (1992). I believe that the simple argument in Example 1 of Krishna (2003) also requires
undominated strategies. I dont know whether the result is true without assuming undominated strategies.
2Papers that deal with necessity have usually assumed this either explicitly or implicitly.
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I have shown that the two properties introduced in this paper are su¢ cient for the existence of
an e¢ cient ex-post equilibrium. I have also shown that if one is concerned only with almost sure
e¢ ciency and requires undominated strategies, then the main property of this paper, the OEP is
also necessary. Similar results have appeared elsewhere, so now I discuss the relationship between
my assumptions and those of the rest of the literature.
3 The Literature
The OEP is inspired in, and closely related to, the following property used in Echenique and Manelli
(2006): v satises the Dominant E¤ect Property if for any s0 and s with some s0j > sj ;
max
j:s0j>sj
vj
 
s0
  vj (s) > max
k:s0jsj
vk
 
s0
  vk (s) :
The OEP is weaker than the DEP in ve dimensions: on the domain of application, OEP applies
more generally (i) OEP applies only when s0  s; (ii) it applies only when jW (s)j > 1; (iii) it applies
only when s0j > sj for players j in W (s) ; the conclusion (what is demanded of the functions) is
weaker because (iv) the inequality in the conclusion is weak and (v) OEP does not require that the
increments be larger (for players whose signals increase), but only that the nal values be larger.
Of these weakenings of the condition in Echenique and Manelli, the only relevant one in terms of
applicability of the property, is the weak inequality in the conclusion. Of course, sets of functions
v that satisfy the OEP and not the DEP (for reasons other than the weak inequality) are easy to
construct, but are not very relevant.3 The strict inequality is di¤erent however, since it excludes,
for example, simple variations of the common value auction in which one players signal has the
same e¤ect on his valuation than on some other players. It is worth emphasizing that Echenique
and Manelli (2006) is not a paper about auctions, but about comparative statics, so they have
dened their DEP in order to yield comparative statics results in a wide variety of contexts, and
not just auctions. Hence, it is not surprising that one can weaken their property when using it in
a particular setting.
I now turn to the discussion of the most relevant papers and their assumptions.
3.1 The OEP is weaker than the Single Crossing property
As an illustration of the importance of the OEP assumption for auctions, we now show that it is
weaker than the Single Crossing condition that I now introduce. Suppose there are two players;
the functions v = (v1; v2) satisfy the Single Crossing Condition if at any s such that v1 (s) = v2 (s)
@vi (s)
@sj
<
@vj (s)
@sj
:
3Consider for example b = 1; v1 = 10 + s1=2 and v2 = s1 + s2: The 10 precludes any equality in valuations, so
OEP is trivially satised, while the DEP is violated for increases in s1:
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This is the version in Dasgupta and Maskin (2000). In Maskin (1992) the inequality is weak,
but applies to all s: Since the Single Crossing is necessary for the existence of e¢ cient equilibria in
two player auctions, the OEP is also necessary.4 Moreover, in addition to being implied by the SC,
the OEP does not require that the value functions v be di¤erentiable, as does the Single Crossing
Condition.
Theorem 3. OEP is weaker than Single Crossing. Suppose that there are only two players,
and that v1 and v2 are di¤erentiable. If v satises the SC condition or the (Maskin) Single
Crossing, it satises the OEP.
Although this theorem is a consequence of the result in the next section (that the Average
Crossing Condition implies the OEP) I present a simple proof of the result.
Proof of Theorem 3. We will assume that the OEP does not hold, and show that this implies
that the SC fails. Take any s00 with jW (s00)j > 1 (i.e. v1 (s00) = v2 (s00)) and an s0  s00 such that
s01 > s001, s02 = s002. We will now show that v1 (s01; s2)  v2 (s01; s2) : Let
" = max

" 2 [0; 1] : v1
 
"s0 + (1  ") s00  v2  "s0 + (1  ") s00	
and notice that " is well dened, since 0 belongs to the set over which the maximum is taken. If
" = 1; there is nothing to prove, so suppose " < 1; and dene s = "s0 + (1  ") s00: We then
have: v1 (s) = v2 (s) and for all s1 such that s01 > s1 > s1, v1 (s1; s2) < v2 (s1; s2) obtains. This
implies that for all s1 > s1
v1 (s1; s2)  v1 (s) < v2 (s1; s2)  v2 (s)) @v1 (s)
@s1
 @v2 (s)
@s1
which contradicts the SC condition, and therefore proves that if SC holds, so does the OEP.
We will now show that if the Maskin Single Crossing holds, so does the OEP. As before, assume
" < 1; so that
v1
 
s01; s2

< v2
 
s01; s2

(1)
and dene s = "s0 + (1  ") s00 which implies v1 (s) = v2 (s). This last equality and equation (1)
contradict Maskins Single Crossing since ;
@v1 (s1; s2)
@s1
 @v2 (s1; s2)
@s1
8s1 2

s01; s1
) s
0
1Z
s1
@v1 (s1; s2)
@s1
ds1 
s01Z
s1
@v2 (s1; s2)
@s1
ds1 )
v1
 
s01; s2
  v1 (s1; s2)  v2  s01; s2  v2 (s1; s2), v1  s01; s2  v2  s01; s2
as was to be shown.
4Di¤erent versions of the statement the single crossing is necessary for an e¢ cient equilibriumcan be found in
Maskin (1992), Birulin and Izmalkov (2003) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2000).
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3.2 The OEP, Average and Cyclical Crossing
In this section I show that the two properties used by Krishna (Average and Cyclical Crossing
Conditions) imply an equal incrementscondition, which in turn implies the OEP. Therefore, this
section shows the connection between both of Krishnas existence results.
For any P  N; let IP denote the vector in Rn with 1 in the jth coordinate i¤ j 2 P and 0
otherwise and let rvk denote the gradient of vk.
Denition. The set of functions v satises:
(a) the Equal Increments Condition if for all P  N there exists j 2 P such that for any s with
jW (s)j > 1 and i =2 P; IPrvj > IPrvi.
(b) Krishnas Average Crossing Condition (ACC) if for any s with jW (s)j > 1 and i 6= j
nX
k=1
@vk
@sj
> n
@vi
@sj
:
(c) Krishnas Cyclical Crossing Condition (CCC) if for all j
@vj
@sj
>
@vj+1
@sj
 @vj+2
@sj
 :::@vj 1
@sj
holds at every s with jW (s)j > 1; where j + k  (j + k) modulo n:
We now prove a simple Lemma that will help us show that both the Average Crossing Condition
and the Cyclical Crossing Condition imply the OEP. The key to showing that these conditions imply
the OEP is making the connection between the e¤ect of one signal on all valuations (as stated in
the ACC and CCC) and the e¤ect of several signals on the valuations of two players.
Lemma A. If v satises the ACC or the CCC then it satises the Equal Increments Condition.
The previous Lemma asserts that when one increases the signals of a set of winners (by the same
small amount) then the total growth of the valuation of one of the players whose signal increased is
larger than the growth of any of those whose signals did not increase. This is just an arms length
away from the OEP.
Theorem 4. OEP is weaker than Average Crossing and Cyclical Crossing. If v satises
the Equal Increments Condition, then it satises the OEP.
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3.3 Birulin & Izmalkov
In this Section I show that the OEP is weaker than the assumptions used in Birulin and Izmalkov.
To do so, I rst describe the equilibrium used in BI, and show that the existence of such an
equilibrium (as implied by the assumptions in BI) implies the OEP.
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the construction of an equilibrium with certain properties.
This kind of equilibrium was previously used in Milgrom and Weber (1982), Maskin (1992), Krishna
(2003) and Birulin and Izmalkov (2003). It is based on the following simple idea. Since exits in
English auctions are public, one players quitting conveys information to the other players about
the quitters signal. Suppose there is an increasing function  (p) mapping prices into proles of
signals such that vi ( (p)) = vj ( (p)) = p for all i and j: Suppose that no player has quit, and the
price is p: Then, in the proposed equilibrium player i stays in the auction as long as si  i (p) and
quits when si = i (p). Therefore, when a player quits, his signal si = i (p) becomes known. This
is a reasonable strategy since, as long as nobody quits, players know that s   (p) and therefore
vi (s)  p for all i: In any sub-auction in which the set of active players is B; let us call yNnB
the vector of known signals of the players who have already quit. The informal description of the
strategies that will be used in the e¢ cient ex-post equilibrium are the following:
 in the empty history, player i remains in the auction as long as b  si > 0Ni (p) (the prole
of signals 0 satises (a) and (b) of Lemma 1, so the function  exists); all players know this;
player i drops at the lowest price p such that si = 0
N
i (p) ; let the price of the rst drop be
p1; let i be the player who drops at p1 and at the time of his drop, player i signal becomes
known, so let yi = 0
N
i
 
p1

;
 let A = Nn fig and yNnA  yi and notice that since 0N
 
p1

satises V 0
N
j

0
N  
p1

= p
for all j; the prole yA = 0
N
 i
 
p1

satises the conditions of Lemma 1, so that a function
y
NnA
satisfying (i)-(iii) in that Lemma exists. Then, player j 2 A remains in the auction as
long as sj  yNnA (p), and drops at the lowest p such that sj = yNnA (p) :
 the process continues in this fashion.
The formal description of the strategies just mentioned is as follows: in a subgame in which types
yNnA are known and active players are A; Ai
 
si;y
NnA = yNnAi (si) = minnp : yNnA (p)  sio :
Notice that since  is continuous and weakly increasing,  is strictly increasing and well dened.
Theorem 5. Suppose that the assumptions of BI are satised. That is, s is drawn from a density,
vs are twice di¤erentiable, regular, rvj (s)  0 for all j and s; and satisfy the Generalized Single
Crossing : for any s with jW (s)j > 1 and any A W (s) ;
max
j2A
urvj (s)  urvk (s)
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for all k 2W (s) nA and any u such that ui > 0 for i 2 A and uj = 0 otherwise. Then, v satises
the OEP.
The previous Theorem shows that Theorem 1 is indeed a generalization of Proposition 1 in Bir-
ulin and Izmalkov (2003): they assume di¤erentiability, densities, regularity, positive gradients and
the GSC; I drop di¤erentiability, densities, regularity, valuations in this paper are only increasing
at ties (and not rvj (s)  0 for all j and s), and the OEP is weaker than the GSC in the presence
of the other assumptions. Moreover, as the next example shows, it would be unfairto compare
just the GSC and the OEP, since the GSC is too weak a property in the absence of the other
assumptions (in particular, regularity).
Example. GSC not su¢ cient in the absence of regularity. Let there be two players, 1 and
2; whose signals s1 and s2 are drawn independently from a density on [0; 1] : Let
z1 (s1) = (2s1   1)5 and z2 (s1) =
(
(2s1   1)3 s1  12
2 (2s1   1)3 s1  12
It is easy to check that if valuations are vi (s) = s1 + s2 + zi (s1) + 1, then all of BIs assumptions
are satised, except for regularity. Also, there is no e¢ cient equilibrium, since we would need that
for all s1 < 12 ; 1 (s1) > 2 (s2) for all s2 and for all s1 >
1
2 ; 1 (s1) < 2 (s2) for all s2: But then,
when player 1 has a signal of 1; he is strictly better o¤ bidding as if he had a signal of 1=4; showing
that there is no e¢ cient equilibrium.
4 Appendix
The following Lemma proves the existence of a  function as described in Section 3.3 for any
(relevant) sub auction. For any set A  N; any player i 2 A; and any y; let V yNnAi : [0; b]jAj ! R
be dened by V y
NnA
i (s) = vi
 
s;yNnA

:
Lemma 1. Fix any B  N; with jBj > 1; and x a prole of types yNnB such that there
exists yB 6= b for which for all i 2 B, yi < b implies vi (y) = maxj2N vj (y) : If v is increasing
and satises the OEP, there exists a pBy > maxi vi (y) and a weakly increasing function 
yNnB :
maxi vi (y) ; p
B
y
!Y
i2B [yi; b] mapping prices into types of active players, such that:
(i) y
NnB
j
 
pBy

= b for some j with yj < b and for all i 2 B; p = pBy and yi < b imply the break
even condition
V y
NnB
i

y
NnB
(p)

= p: (2)
holds;
(ii) for all p < pBy ; if yi < b then 
yNnB
i (p) < b and the break even condition (2) hold;
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(iii) for all p  pBy ; and all k 2 N; vk

y
NnB
(p) ;yNnB

 p:
The previous Lemma provides the basis for the existence of an ex-post and e¢ cient equilibrium.
The proof is based on a method rst introduced in Echenique and Manelli, which does not require
di¤erentiability of v; or the existence of a density for the distribution of types. Although this proof
is more involved than theirs, beause it is based on a weaker property and does not use a border
condition that they had assumed, the basic idea is the same.
The proof of Lemma 1 is based on the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. Fix any A  N; with jAj > 1; and x a prole of types yNnA such that there exists a
yA for which:
(a) for all i; j 2 A; vi (y) = vj (y) and yi < b
(b) for all k =2 A; and i 2 A; vk (y)  vi (y) :
If v satises the OEP, there exists a pAy > vi (y) = V
yNnA
i
 
yA

(for i 2 A) and a weakly increasing
function y
NnA
:
h
V y
NnA
i
 
yA

; pAy
i
!
Y
i2A [yi; b] mapping prices into types of active players, such
that:
(i) y
NnA
j
 
pAy

= b for some j; and for all i 2 A; p = pAy implies that the condition (2) holds.
(ii) for all p < pAy ; 
yNnA (p) b = (b; :::; b) and the break even condition (2) holds for all i 2 A.
(iii) for all p  pAy ; and all k 2 N; vk

y
NnA
(p) ;yNnA

 p
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix any A and y that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Let
 
b;yA i

denote
the vector yA with the ith component replaced by a b: Since V y
NnA
i is strictly increasing in si and
yi < b (by (a)) we get for all i; V
yNnA
i
 
yA

< V y
NnA
i
 
b;yA i

:
Dening a nonempty set X. For any i 2 A; let  =
h
V y
NnA
i
 
yA

;mini V
yNnA
i
 
b;yA i
i
(which
is independent of i) and let P be the set of nonempty subsets of  that contain V yNnAi
 
yA

= vi (y) :
The set P has typical elements P and P 0; and each is a set of prices. Let Y =

(P; ) : P 2 P,  : P !Q
A

yAi ; b

and X  Y be
X =
n
(P; ) :  is weakly increasing,  (vi (y)) = yA and V
yNnA
i ( (p)) = p, 8i 2 A;8p 2 P
o
:
Notice that by condition (a) P = fp : p = vi (y) for some i 2 Ag 2 P is a singleton and the function
 dened by  (vi (y)) = yA satises V
yNnA
i ( (p)) = p: Therefore, X is nonempty.
Dening a partial order on X. Dene a partial order on X by (P 0; 0)  (P; ) if and only if
P 0  P and 0 (p) =  (p) for all p 2 P:
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Showing that every chain in X has an upper bound. Take any totally ordered set in X (a
chain) f(P; )g in X and dene P  [P and  : P !
Q
A

yAi ; b

through  (p) =  (p) for
any  such that p 2 P: Notice that the denition of  does not depend on the specic  chosen,
since if p belongs to two di¤erent P and P0 ; we still get  (p) = 0 (p) : I will rst show that
(P; ) 2 X; and then that (P; ) is an upper bound for f(P; )g :
It is easy to check that  is weakly increasing. Also, for any p 2 P; there is some  for which:
p 2 P and  (p) =  (p) : Then, since (P; ) 2 X; we get
V y
NnA
i ( (p)) = p) V y
NnA
i ( (p)) = p
showing that (P; ) 2 X:
To see that (P; ) is an upper bound, note that for any  we have P  P and  (p) =  (p)
for all p 2 P:
Showing that the maximal element implied by Zorns Lemma must have P = : Zorns
lemma then ensures that there exists a maximal element
 
PM ; M

in X: We now show that
PM = . Suppose p0 =2 PM ; notice that we have vi (y) 2 PM and vi (y) is a lower bound for PM ;
so
ep 2 PM : ep < p0	 is nonempty, so dene p = supep ep 2 PM : ep < p0	. If there is some p 2 PM
such that p > p0 let
p = infep
ep 2 PM : ep > p0	 :
Case A, p =2 PM : Consider rst the case in which p =2 PM : We set P 0 = PM [ fpg and letting
fpng be an increasing sequence in PM that converges to p; dene 0 on P 0 through
0 (p) =
(
0 (p) = M (p) for all p 6= p0
0 (p) = limn M (pn)
:
Since M is increasing, the limit is well dened. Moreover, it is easy to check that 0 is increasing.
For all p 2 PM ; we already know that V yNnAi (0 (p)) = V y
NnA
i
 
M (p)

= p holds, and for p; we
also have that, by continuity of V y
NnA
i ;
V y
NnA
i
 
0 (p)

= V y
NnA
i

lim
n
M (pn)

= lim
n
V y
NnA
i
 
M (pn)

= lim
n
pn = p
establishing that (P 0; 0) 2 X: Since (P 0; 0)   PM ; M by construction, this contradicts  PM ; M
being maximal.
Case B, p 2 PM and 9p 2 PM such that p > p0: Consider now the case in which p 2 PM ; so
that p < p0: If there is some p 2 PM such that p > p0; one can follow the same steps as in Case A
to discard the case in which p =2 PM ; so assume that p 2 PM . Let s =  (p), and s =  (p) and
x any p with
p < p < minV
yNnA
i (si;  i (p))  p (3)
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Assume, without loss of generality, that si > si for all i (when they are equal, the signal of player
i just becomes a xed parameterin the V functions, and thus plays no role).
Let g : R ! ( 1; 1) be any strictly decreasing function with g (0) = 0: Let V yNnAi (s) =
V y
NnA
i (s)  p and for i 2 A; let
hi (s) =
8>><>>:
si + g

V y
NnA
i (s)

(si   si) if V y
NnA
i (s) > 0
si if V
yNnA
i (s) = 0
si + g

V y
NnA
i (s)

(si   si) if V y
NnA
i (s) < 0
The function
h :
Y
A
[si; si]!
Y
A
[si; si]
satises hypothesis of Brouwer, so there is a xed point sf . We will now show that for all i;
V y
NnA
i

sf

= p: (4)
1. Suppose that for some i; V y
NnA
i
 
sf

> p: If V y
NnA
i
 
sf

> p; we get V y
NnA
i
 
sf

> 0; and
since hi
 
sf

= si ; we must have s
f
i = si (otherwise, g

V y
NnA
i
 
sf

would be subtracting
something from sfi ). We then get V
yNnA
i

si; s
f
 i

> p and since equation (3) ensures
V y
NnA
i (s) = V
yNnA
i ( (p)) = p;
we must have sfj > si for some j: Let k be the player in P
 
sf ; s

for whom V y
NnA
k
 
sf

=
maxi2P(sf ;s) V
yNnA
i
 
sf

: By applying the OEP we see that that for player i with V y
NnA
i
 
sf

>
p and sfi = si;
V y
NnA
k

sf

 max
j =2P(sf ;s)
V y
NnA
j

sf

 V yNnAi

sf

> p:
Then, player k is such that V y
NnA
k
 
sf

> p; but since k 2 P  sf ; s ; we must have sfk > sk
and
hk

sf

= sfk = s
f
k + g

V y
NnA
k

sf

sfk   sk

with g

V y
NnA
k
 
sf

< 0 (because V y
NnA
k
 
sf

> p and this means V y
NnA
k
 
sf

> 0) which
contradicts sf being a xed point.
2. If V y
NnA
m
 
sf

< p; for some m; then, since hm
 
sf

= sfm; we must have s
f
m = sm; because
otherwise g

V y
NnA
m
 
sf

would be adding something strictly positive to sm. Because we can
use that v is Increasing at Ties with s0 =

sm; s
f
 m;yNnA

and s =
 
 (p) ;yNnA

; we obtain
p > V y
NnA
m

sf

= V y
NnA
m

sm; s
f
 m

 V yNnAm
 
sm; s m

= V y
NnA
m (sm;  m (p))
 minV yNnAi (si;  i (p)) > p
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which is a contradiction. That is, we had chosen a small p; so that a large increase in the
signal of m from sm to sm increases V
yNnA
m above p:
Items 1 and 2 have established that V y
NnA
i
 
sf

= p for all i; so that P 0 = PM [ fpg and
0 (ep) = ( 0 (ep) = M (ep) for all ep 6= p
0 (p) = sf
satisfy (P 0; 0)   PM ; M which contradicts  PM ; M being maximal. We conclude that PM =
; and that M maps  =
h
V y
NnA
i
 
yA

;mini V
yNnA
i
 
b;yA i
i
into
Q
A

yAi ; b

, is increasing and
V y
NnA
i
 
M (p)

= p, 8i 2 A;8p 2 :
Case C, p 2 PM and @p 2 PM such that p > p0: Recall s =  (p) and x any p with
p = V
yNnA
i (s) < p  minVi
 
b;yA i

: (5)
Let g : R! ( 1; 1) be any strictly decreasing function with g (0) = 0: Let V yNnAi (s) = V y
NnA
i (s) p
and for i 2 A; let
hi (s) =
8>><>>:
si + g

V y
NnA
i (s)

(si   si) if V y
NnA
i (s) > 0
si if V
yNnA
i (s) = 0
si + g

V y
NnA
i (s)

(b  si) if V y
NnA
i (s) < 0
The function h has a xed point sf , so we will show that for all i; V y
NnA
i
 
sf

= p:
1. Suppose that for some i; V y
NnA
i
 
sf

> p; so that sfi = si. We then get V
yNnA
i

si; s
f
 i

> p
and since V y
NnA
i (s) < p; we must have s

j > sj for some j: Let k be the player in P
 
sf ; s

for whom V y
NnA
k
 
sf

= maxi2P(sf ;s) V
yNnA
i
 
sf

: By applying the OEP we see that that for
player i with V y
NnA
i
 
sf

> p and sfi = si;
V y
NnA
k

sf

 max
j =2P(sf ;s)
V y
NnA
j

sf

 V yNnAi

sf

> p:
Then, player k is such that V y
NnA
k
 
sf

> p; but since k 2 P  sf ; s ; we must have sfk > sk
and
hk

sf

= sfk = s
f
k + g

V y
NnA
k

sf

sfk   sk

with g

V y
NnA
k
 
sf

< 0 which contradicts sf being a xed point.
2. If V y
NnA
i
 
sf

< p; for some i; then, since hi
 
sf

= sfi ; we must have s
f
i = b: Then, using
the choice of p in equation (5) and that v is Increasing at Ties, with s0 =

b; sf i;y
NnA

and
s = y, we obtain
p > V y
NnA
i

sf

= V y
NnA
i

b; sf i

 V yNnAi
 
b;yA i
  minV yNnAi  b;yA i  p
which is a contradiction.
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Items 1 and 2 have established for all i; so that P 0 = PM [ fpg and
0 (ep) = ( 0 (ep) = M (ep) for all ep 6= p
0 (p) = sf
satisfy (P 0; 0)   PM ; M which contradicts  PM ; M being maximal. We conclude that PM =
; and that M maps  =
h
V y
NnA
i
 
yA

;mini V
yNnA
i
 
b;yA i
i
into
Q
A

yAi ; b

, is increasing and
V y
NnA
i
 
M (p)

= p, 8i 2 A;8p 2 :
So far we have established that for all p in
h
V y
NnA
i
 
yA

;mini V
yNnA
i
 
b;yA i
i
there exists of a
prole of signals y
NnA
(p)  sf such that V yNnAi

y
NnA
(p)

= V y
NnA
i
 
sf

= p for all i; for all
p  minVi
 
b;yA i

, and y
NnA
is increasing. Since y and A are xed throughout the proof, we will
let  (p) stand for y
NnA
(p) :
Let p1 = minVi
 
b;yA i

and x s1 = 
 
p1

: If s1i = b for some i; the proof is complete by
letting pAy = p
1 since for all p < p1 we have that  (p)  b; for if i (p) was equal to b; we would
get the following contradiction
p = Vi ( (p))  minVi ( (p))  minVi
 
b;yA i

= p1 > p:
So assume s1i < b for all i: Then, we have that
p1 = minVi
 
b;yA i

= Vi
 

 
p1

= Vi
 
s1

and s1i < b imply that p
1 < minVi
 
b; s1 i
  p2: Fix any p1 < p  p2: We can now repeat exactly
the same steps as we have done so far (with s1 in place of yA) and show that in the domainh
V y
NnA
i
 
yA

;mini Vi
 
b; s1 i
i
one has an increasing function  () such that Vi ( (p)) = p for all
i: Fix any s2 = 
 
p2

; and notice again that if i
 
p2

= b for some i; the proof is complete by
letting pAy = p
2:
Continuing in this fashion, we get an increasing sequence of st and pt with the properties that
for all i;
Vi
 
st

= pt < pt+1 = min
i
Vi
 
b; st i

:
In the limit p1; s1 we obtain for all i
Vi (s
1) = p1 = min
i
Vi
 
b; s1 i

and so, for some i; Vi (s1) = p1 = Vi
 
b; s1 i

. Since Vi is increasing in si this means that s1i = b;
so that we can set pAy = p
1: This completes the proof of (i) and (ii).
To establish (iii) set s0 =

y
NnA
(p) ;yNnA

and s = y: If s0 = s conditions (a) and (b) yield
the desired result, so assume s0 6= s: Note that: k 2 A implies p = vk

y
NnA
(p) ;yNnA

; k =2 A
implies that k =2 P (s0; s) so that the OEP and P (s0; s)  A ensure
p = max
k2P (s0;s)
vk

y
NnA
(p) ;yNnA

 max
k=2P (s0;s)
vk

y
NnA
(p) ;yNnA

 vk

y
NnA
(p) ;yNnA

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for all k =2 A as was to be shown.
The previous Lemma establishes the existence of a  function that maps prices into signals, the
resulting prole of signals being the presumption that other players will have about a players
signal, if he quits at a certain price. The set A is the set of activeplayers at a certain moment,
and the prole of signals y is decomposed in the set of signals of inactive players yNnA and the
set of signals such that all active players have signals greater than yA: Lemma 1 describes the
presumption of other players about a certain players signal, when he should have quit, but he
didnt (in the sense that his presumed signal is b; but he didnt quit). The di¤erence with the
previous Lemma is that we allow some elements of yB to be equal to b (whereas in Lemma 2 we
had yBi < b for all i in B).
Proof of Lemma 1. Let B and y be as in the statement of this Lemma. Consider rst the case
in which yk < b for k = i; j 2 B; i 6= j. Dening A = Bn fj 2 B : yj = bg and applying Lemma 2
yields the desired result. So assume there is a unique i 2 B such that yi < b: Let pBy = vi (b;y i)
and let v 1i (p;y i) be the inverseof vi; dened by
vi
 
v 1i (p;y i) ;y i
  p:
Then, it is easy to check that y
NnB
dened by
y
NnB
j (p) =
(
b j 2 Bn fig
v 1i (p;y i) j = i
:
satises conditions (i) and (ii). To check condition (iii), two cases must be considered.
(I) If jW (y)j > 1; we have that for
s0 =

y
NnB
i (p) ;y i

=

y
NnB
i (p) ; b; :::; b;y
NnB

=

y
NnB
(p) ;yNnB

and s = y, i = P (s0; s) the OEP implies that for all p;
p = vi
 
s0

= max
j2P (s0;s)
vj
 
s0
  max
j 6=i
vj
 
s0

= max
j 6=i
vj

y
NnB
(p) ;yNnB

as was to be shown.
(II) If jW (y)j = 1; we have that for p = maxj vj (y) = vi (y) ;
vi

y
NnB
(p) ;yNnB

= max
j2N
vj (y) > max
j 6=i
vj (y) = max
j 6=i
vj

y
NnB
(p) ;yNnB

: (6)
Suppose that contrary to what we want to show, there was some p such that for some j 6= i
vj

y
NnB
(p) ;yNnB

> p = vi

y
NnB
(p) ;yNnB

: (7)
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Given equations (6) and (7), continuity of y
NnB
(p) (ensured by construction) and Bolzanos The-
orem, there exists a p such that maxj 6=i vj

y
NnB
(p) ;yNnB

= vi

y
NnB
(p) ;yNnB

: Then,
letting s0 =

y
NnB
i (p) ;y i

and s =

y
NnB
i (p
) ;y i

the OEP implies
vi
 
s0
  max
k 6=i
vk
 
s0
  vj  s0, vi yNnBi (p) ;y i  vj yNnB (p) ;yNnB
which contradicts (7), and therefore completes the proof.
The next Lemma gives the connection between one set of functions B and the set of functions
A when A = Bn flg for some l 2 B: This gives the relation between the bidding strategies in
a sub-auction with active players B; and the one that follows after player l has dropped out. If
various players drop out at the same price, one only needs to apply the Lemma repeatedly at the
price of the drops (ep in the Lemma).
Lemma 3. Fix any B  N; with jBj > 2; and x a set of types yNnB such that there exists
a yB 6= b for which for all i 2 B, yi < b implies vi (y) = maxj2N vj (y) : Assume that v is
increasing and satises the OEP, and x a pBy and 
yNnB as in the statement of Lemma 1. Fix
any l 2 B and let A = Bn flg. For any ep  pBy , if sB = yNnB (ep) then for z   yNnB; sl
there exists pAz  vi
 
sB;yNnB

= V zi
 
sA

(for i with yi < b) and a weakly increasing function
z :

V zi
 
sA

; pAz
!Y
i2A [si; b] mapping prices into types of active players, such that:
(i) zj
 
pAz

= b for some j with yj < b and for all i 2 A; p = pAy and yi < b imply the break even
condition
V zi (
z (p)) = p: (8)
(ii) for all p < pAz ; if yi < b then 
z
i (p) < b and the break even condition (8) holds for all i 2 A.
(iii) for all p  pAy ; and all k 2 N; vk

y
NnA
(p) ;yNnA

 p:
(iv) for all j 2 A
zj (ep) = yNnBj (ep) :
Proof of Lemma 3. Items (i), (ii) and (iii) follow as a direct application of Lemma 1. Then, item
(iv) follows because for all i; zi (ep)  sAi ; and if zj (ep) > sAj we would get (using s0 = sAj ; z j (p) ; z
and s =
 
sA; z

and that v is Increasing at Ties)
ep = V zj (z (ep)) > V zj  sAj ; z j (p)  V zj  sA = vj sB;yNnB = V yNnBj  sB = V yNnBj yNnB (ep) = ep
which is a contradiction.
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We now show that the  function is continuous.
Lemma 4. Continuity. For every A and yNnA satisfying the conditions of Lemma 1, the function
y
NnA
is continuous.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose that  is discontinuous at p. It must be either not continuous from
the right, or from the left, so assume without loss of generality that it is discontinuous from the
left: there is an " such that for all  there is some p with p  p <  but  (p)  (p)  " (we have
used  non decreasing). Fix then 1 = 1 and p1 < p such that p   p1 <  but  (p)   (p1)  ".
Pick then, by induction, 0 < n < p   pn 1 and p   pn < n but  (p)    (pn)  ": We then
obtain: pn ! p; pn is increasing,  (pn) is increasing and therefore has a limit (since its bounded
above by b) s1 and s1 6=  (p) ; s1   (p) (because  (pn)   (p) for all n).
Since for all n and for all i; Vi ( (pn)) = pn we obtain by continuity of Vi;
p = lim pn = limVi ( (pn)) = Vi (lim (pn)) = Vi (s1) :
But then, s1 6=  (p) and s1   (p) imply that for some i; s1i < i (p). This, in turn,
means that since Vi is strictly increasing in si and Increasing at ties (at s1 all are tied), Vi (s1) <
Vi ( (p
)) = p: This is a contradiction, and shows that  is continuous.
Proof of Theorem 1. E¢ ciency. We will prove that the prole of strategies that in any auction
with active players A and signals of inactive players yNnA calls for a player with signal si to quit
at a price y
NnA
i (si) = min
n
p : y
NnA
(p)  si
o
, for  as in Lemma 1, is an ex post equilibrium.
We will then show that it is also e¢ cient.
The rst part of the proof (ex-post equilibrium) follows Krishnas Lemma 1 closely, but does not
use the fact that  is unique or strictly increasing. Consider bidder 1 and suppose that all bidders
i > 1 are following the strategy i. We will now show that player 1 does not have a protable
deviation.
Consider rst the case in which following 1 player 1 wins when active players are A and signals
are s: this can only happen if players in An f1g drop at the same price, say p: We will now show
that he earns a prot, so that no deviations are protable: quitting before earns him 0; and he can
never change the price he pays. Without loss of generality, let A = f2; 3; :::; ag : Since all strategies
 are increasing, all bidders in A can infer the signals sNnA of inactive bidders from the prices at
which they dropped. Also, since player i = 2; :::; a drop at p and
s
NnA
i (si) = min
n
p : s
NnA
(p)  si
o
= p
we obtain si = s
NnA
i (p
) : Moreover, s1 > s
NnA
1 (p
) and therefore V sNnA1

s
NnA
(p)

= p
implies
v1 (s) = v1

s1; 
sNnA
 1 (p
) ; sNnA

> v1

s
NnA
(p) ; sNnA

= V s
NnA
1

s
NnA
(p)

= p
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which means that player 1 makes a prot, as was to be shown.
As a second alternative, consider the case in which 1 calls for bidder 1 to drop at some price
p1 in some sub-auction with active bidders A = f1; 2; :::; ag ; when the other players quit at signals
sNnA, and suppose that bidder 1 considers staying longer until he wins the object. Suppose he
stays until winning and that bidders quit in the order a; a  1; a  2; :::; 2 at prices pa  :::; p2; so
that 1 wins at a price p2: We will show that by doing this he cant make a prot.
For p2, the price at which player 2 quits, s2 = s
Nnf1;2g
2 (p2) so (iii) of Lemma 1 implies that
p2  v1

s
Nnf1;2g
1 (p2) ; s 1

: (9)
Then, since for each xed pair
 
B; sNnB

the function s
NnB
is increasing and when a bidder j 2 B
drops out at pj , we get s
NnB
(pj) = 
sNnfBnfjgg (pj) (by (iv) of Lemma 3), we obtain
s
Nnf1;2g
1 (p2)  s
Nnf1;2g
1 (p3) = 
sNnf1;2;3g
1 (p3)  s
Nnf1;2;3g
1 (p4) = 
sNnf1;2;3;4g
1 (p4)  :::
 sNnfAnfagg (pa) = sNnA1 (pa)  s
NnA
1 (p

1) = s1: (10)
(the last equality follows from the fact that player 1 was supposed to quit at p1). Equations (9)
and (10) imply that p2  v1 (s) so that player 1 cant make a prot by staying longer than what
his strategy calls for.
We have already shown that it is not protable to quit when 1 calls for staying, and it is not
protable to stay when 1 calls for quitting. We will now show that if in some o¤ equilibrium
path, player 1 is still active at price p when he should have quit at price p1 < p; then quitting is a
best response (in particular, it is better than winning at p). Let the set of active bidders at p be
J = f1; :::; jg : Then, as in equation (10),
s
NnJ
1 (p)  s
NnJ
1 (pj+1) = 
sNnfJ[fj+1gg
1 (pj+1)  :::  s
NnA
1 (pa)  s
NnA
1 (p

1) = s1
so that p  v1

s
NnJ
(p) ; sNnJ

implies p  v1

s1; 
sNnJ 1 (p) ; sNnJ

. This means quitting, as his
strategy prescribes, is optimal. This completes the proof that the prole of strategies dened by 
is an ex-post equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 1. E¢ ciency. Without loss of generality, suppose that at a prole of signals
s the winner is player 1 and that the last to quit is player 2 at price p2: Then, we have that s1 >
s
Nnf1;2g
1 (p2) ; s2 > 
sNnf1;2g
2 (p2) and v1

s
Nnf1;2g
(p2) ; s
Nnf1;2g

= v2

s
Nnf1;2g
(p2) ; s
Nnf1;2g

:
The OEP then tells us that for
P = P

s;

s
Nnf1;2g
(p2) ; s
Nnf1;2g

we must have
v1 (s) = max
i2P
vi (s)  max
j =2P
vj (s)
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establishing e¢ ciency. 5
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 4, we prove Lemma A, which in turn uses this simple
result.
Lemma 5. If v satises the ACC, then for all P  N such that j 2 P we have that for any s with
jW (s)j > 1 and i 6= j X
k2P
@vk (s)
@sj
> jP j @vi (s)
@sj
Proof of Lemma 5. The proof proceeds by induction on the size of P: We already know that the
result is true for P = N; so assume it is true for all P 0 with jP 0j = m + 1: In order to obtain a
contradiction, suppose that for some P with jP j = m; j 2 P , and some s with jW (s)j > 1 and i 6= j
we had
P
P
@vk
@sj
 jP j @vi@sj : In such a case, we must have i 2 P; since otherwise, for P 0 = P [ fig
we would have
P
P 0
@vk
@sj
 jP 0j @vi@sj ; contradicting the induction hypothesis. We must also have
@vi=@sj > @vh=@sj for all h =2 P; since otherwise, for some h =2 P with @vi=@sj  @vh=@sj we would
have that for P 0 = P [ fhgX
k2P
@vk
@sj
 jP j @vi
@sj
 jP j @vh
@sj
)
X
P 0
@vk
@sj
 P 0 @vh
@sj
contradicting the induction hypothesis. But then @vi=@sj > @vh=@sj for all h =2 P; implies thatX
k2P
@vk
@sj
 jP j @vi
@sj
)
X
k2P
@vk
@sj
+
X
h=2P
@vh
@sj
< jP j @vi
@sj
+ jNnP j @vi
@sj
,
X
k2N
@vk
@sj
< jN j @vi
@sj
which contradicts the ACC. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma A. Let us start with the claim that the ACC implies the Equal Increments
Condition. For all h 2 P; and i =2 P; by Lemma 5, PP @vk(s)@sh > jP j @vi(s)@sh . Keeping i xed, and
adding over all h 2 P; we obtainX
h2P
X
k2P
@vk (s)
@sh
>
X
h2P
jP j @vi (s)
@sh
:
We can write the previous equation asX
k2P
IPrvk > jP j IPrvi:
This implies that for some j 2 P; IPrvj > IPrvi as was to be shown.
Now assume that v satises the CCC, and pick any s with jW (s)j > 1 and any i =2 P: We must
show that there exists j 2 P such that IPrvj > IPrvi: Suppose rst that there is some k 2 P with
5Vijay: in the proof of your Lemma 4, dont you need to ensure that after a player has quit his value does not
surpass that of the players that remain in the auction?
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k < i and let j be the largest k in P which is still smaller than i: That is, if P = f1; 2; 5g and i = 4;
pick j = 2: In order to show that IPrvj > IPrvi; it will su¢ ce to show that for all k 2 Pn fjg ;
@vj=@sk  @vi=@sk; since then @vj=@sj > @vi=@sj will make the desired inequality strict. Notice
that for all k < i; we have k < j < i; so by the CCC, we have @vj=@sk  @vi=@sk: For k > i; we
have that the CCC tells us that
@vk
@sk
>
@vn
@sk
 @v1
@sk
 @vj
@sk
 @vi
@sk
:
Suppose now that for the chosen i there is no k < i in P: For j  maxk2P P we will show,
as before, that for all k 2 Pn fjg ; @vj=@sk  @vi=@sk: Notice that for all k 2 Pn fjg we have
i > k > j; so the CCC tells us that
@vk
@sk
>
@vj
@sk
 @vn
@sk
 @v1
@sk
 @vi
@sk
as was to be shown.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose the OEP is violated, so that there exists an s with jW (s)j > 1
and an s0  s such that s0j > sj if and only if j 2 P W (s), and that for all j 2 P; vj (s0) < vi (s0)
for some i: Without loss of generality, suppose P = f1; :::;mg and assume also without loss of
generality, that s01   s1  s02   s2  :::  s0m   sm: Dene
1 = max f : 9j 2 P; vj (s+ IP)  vi (s+ IP)8i =2 Pg :
Note that 1  s01   s1 would imply that there are j 2 P and i =2 P such that vj (s+ IP1) =
vi (s+ IP1) and that for all " > 0; vk (s+ IP [1 + "]) < vi (s+ IP [1 + "]) for all k 2 P: Taking
derivatives with respect to " and evaluating at " = 0; we obtain that for s0 = s + IP1 we have
jW (s0)j > 1; and that IPrvk (s+ IP1)  IPrvi (s+ IP1) for all k 2 P , which contradicts
Lemma A, and would therefore conclude the proof. Assume then 1 > s01   s1:
Dene then P2 = Pn f1g, and
2 = max

 : 9j 2 P2; vj
  
s01; s 1

+ IP2
  vi   s01; s 1+ IP2 8i =2 P2	 :
That is, we have replaced s by (s01; s 1) and we will now show that we cant have 2 
s02   s2: Since 1 > s01   s1; the set on which 2 is dened is non-empty, so 2 is well de-
ned. If we had 2  s02   s2; we would obtain that there are j 2 P2 and i =2 P2 such that
vj ((s
0
1; s 1) + IP22) = vi ((s01; s 1) + IP22) and that for all " > 0; vk ((s01; s 1) + IP2 [2 + "]) <
vi ((s
0
1; s 1) + IP2 [2 + "]) for all k 2 P2: Taking derivatives with respect to " and evaluating at
" = 0; we obtain that for s0 = (s01; s 1) + IP22 we have jW (s0)j > 1; and that for all k 2 P2
IP2rvk
 
s0
  IP2rvi  s0
which contradicts Lemma A, and would therefore conclude the proof.
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Fix some l  m and dene es =  s01; :::; s0l 1; sl; sl+1; :::; sn and Pl = Pn f1; :::; l   1g : As an
induction hypothesis, suppose that for some j 2 Pl; vj (es)  vi (es) for all i =2 Pl (we have already
proved this for l = 1 and l = 2) and dene
l = max f : 9j 2 Pl; vj (es+ IPl)  vi (es+ IPl)8i =2 Plg :
Again, if we had l  s0l   sl we would obtain that there are j 2 Pl and i =2 Pl such that
vj (es+ IPll) = vi (es+ IPll) and that for all " > 0; vk (es+ IPl [l + "]) < vi (es+ IPl [l + "]) for all
k 2 Pl: Taking derivatives with respect to " and evaluating at " = 0; we obtain that for s0 = es+IPll
we have jW (s0)j > 1; and that IPlrvk (s0)  IPlrvi (s0) for all k 2 Pl: This contradiction concludes
the proof.
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 2, we state and prove two simple facts that will help
in the proof.
Fact 1. For jP j = 1. Assume the Hypothesis of Theorem 2 (although undominated is not needed).
If s001 > s1; s00i = s

i for i = 2; 3 ;W (s
) = f1g and 1; j =2 W (s00) for j 6= 1; then there is a  such
that no e¢ cient equilibrium exists. To see so, set  (s) =  (s00) = 1=2, suppose without loss of
generality that 3 2W (s00) (i.e. j = 2). Suppose there is an e¢ cient equilibrium. The quitting price
of 2 is irrelevant, so let 3 be the quitting price of player 3 when player 1 is active. We must have,
by e¢ ciency, 1 (s
00
1) < 3 < 1 (s

1) : Since 1 (s

1) is a best response, player 1 wants the object at
a price of 3 and we must therefore have v1 (s

1; s2; s3)  3: But then v1 (s001; s2; s3) > v1 (s1; s2; s3)
implies that 1 (s
0
1) is not a best response, and 1 would like to pretend that his signal is s

1 when
it is s01: This concludes the proof of Fact 1.
Fact 2. For jP j = 2. Assume the Hypothesis of Theorem 2. If s00i > si for i = 1; 2 ; s003 =
s3 ;W (s) = f1; 2g and W (s00) = 1; then there is a  such that no e¢ cient equilibrium in undom-
inated strategies exists. For a proof, let  (s) =  (s00) = 1=2 and let 3 be the quitting price of
player 3 when all players are active. Notice that, given the perfect correlation, it is a dominant
strategy for players 1 and 2 to bid their valuations, so letting i () denote the bidding strategy of
player i in the empty history, we obtain i (s

i ) = vj (s
) for i; j = 1; 2: E¢ ciency requires that in
state s player 3 quits before 1 or 2; and hence
i (s

i ) = vi (s
) > 3: (11)
But in state s00 player 3 cant be the rst to quit, so we must have 3 > mini<3 i (s00i ) =
mini<3 vi (s
00) ; so joining this with equation (11) we obtain
v1 (s
) = v2 (s) > 3 > min
i<3
vi
 
s00

which contradicts vi (s00) > vi (s) for i = 1; 2: This concludes the proof of Fact 2.
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Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that for some s with si > 0 for all i and jW (s)j > 1 we have
s0  s; s0j > sj if and only if j 2 P  f1; 2g =W (s) but that maxk=2P vk (s0) > vj (s0) for all j 2 P:
Consider now the four cases in which there is only one winner at s and call him player 1;
P = f1g :
a. P = f1g and v2 (s0) 6= v3 (s0) and v2 (s) > v3 (s) : Since v1 (s) = v2 (s) ; the regularity assump-
tion ensures that there is a (es1; es2) close to s (in particular, we need s01 > es1) such that: for
s = (es1; es2; s3) we obtain v1 (s) > v2 (s) > v3 (s) ; for s00 = (s01; es2; s3) ; it is still true that
v2 (s
00) 6= v3 (s00) and since es2 is close to s2 it will still be true that 1 =2W (s00). Formally, this
is just an application of the inverse function theorem: we pick any values of v1 and v2 that
we want in the open set around (v1 (s) ; v2 (s)) ; and the inverse function theorem tells us that
there exists an s in a neighborhood of s such that v1 (s) = v1 and v2 (s) = v2: Now apply
Fact 1:
b. P = f1g and v2 (s0) = v3 (s0) and v2 (s) > v3 (s) : First, as before, choose (es1; es2) (s01 > es1),
so that: for s = (es1; es2; s3) we obtain v1 (s) > v2 (s) > v3 (s) ; for s000 = (s01; es2; s3) ;
since es2 is close to s2; it is still true that 1 =2 W (s000). If v2 (s000) 6= v3 (s000) ; set s = s and
s00 = s000 and apply Fact 1. If v2 (s000) = v3 (s000) ; apply the regularity assumption to obtain
(s2; s3) close to (es2; s3) that preserve the inequalities
v1 (es1; es2; s3) > v2 (es1; es2; s3) > v3 (es1; es2; s3) and v1  s01; es2; s3 < v2  s01; es2; s3
but for which v2 (s01; s2; s3) 6= v3 (s01; s2; s3) : Then apply Fact 1 with s00 = (s01; s2; s3) and
s = (es1; s2; s3).
c. P = f1g and v2 (s0) 6= v3 (s0) and v2 (s) = v3 (s) : Using the regularity assumption, slightly
perturb s to s to obtain v1 (s) > maxi6=1 vi (s) ; while preserving s01 > s1, v2 (s01; s2; s3) 6=
v3 (s
0
1; s

2; s

3) and one of them greater than v1 (s
0
1; s

2; s

3) : Then apply Case a, or Case b,
depending on whether v2 (s) is di¤erent or equal to v3 (s) :
d. P = f1g and v2 (s0) = v3 (s0) and v2 (s) = v3 (s) : Using the regularity assumption, slightly
perturb s to s to obtain v1 (s) > v2 (s) > v3 (s) ; while preserving s01 > s1 and
preserving, for s000 = (s01; s2 ; s3 ) ; v1 (s000) < maxi6=1 vi (s000) : If v2 (s000) 6= v3 (s000) ; set s = s
and s00 = s000 and apply Fact 1. If v2 (s000) = v3 (s000) ; apply the regularity assumption to obtain
(s2; s3) close to (s2 ; s3 ) that preserve the inequalities
v1 (es1; s2 ; s3 ) > v2 (es1; s2 ; s3 ) > v3 (es1; s2 ; s3 ) and v1  s01; s2 ; s3  < v2  s01; s2 ; s3 
but for which v2 (s01; s2; s3) 6= v3 (s01; s2; s3) : Then apply Fact 1 with s00 = (s01; s2; s3) and
s = (es1; s2; s3).
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Consider now the two cases in which P = f1; 2g : either v3 (s) = v1 (s) = v2 (s) or v3 (s) <
v1 (s) = v2 (s) : If the latter is the case, apply Fact 2 with s00 = s0 and s = s: If v3 (s) = v1 (s) =
v2 (s) ; the inverse function theorem (and the regularity assumption) ensure that there is an open
set around v (s) = (v1 (s) ; v2 (s) ; v3 (s)) such that one can pick any v = (v1; v2; v3) in that neigh-
borhood and there will exist an s such that v (s) = v: We then pick v1 = v2 > v3 close
enough to v (s) ; and s will satisfy s0i > s

i for i = 1; 2 and also, for s
00 = (s01; s02; s3) ; we still get
v3 (s
00) > maxi<3 vi (s00) : Then, apply Fact 2. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 5. Pick any s such that jW (s)j > 1 and suppose that s0  s and s0j > sj if and
only if j 2 P (s0; s) W (s) :We will now show thatmaxj2P (s0;s) vj (s0)  maxk=2P (s0;s) vk (s0). To ob-
tain a contradiction, suppose that for some player i =2 P (s0; s) we have vi (s0) = maxk=2P (s0;s) vk (s0) >
maxj2P (s0;s) vj (s0) : In the equilibrium proposed by BI, all players not in P (s0; s) are inactive at
p = vj (s) for j 2 P (s0; s)  W (s) (either they had quit before p or quit at p) and so cant win
the auction when types are s0: Since the winners at s0 are not in P (s0; s) ; the equilibrium cant be
e¢ cient and this contradicts Proposition 1 in BI, which asserts that under their assumptions, the
proposed equilibrium is e¢ cient.
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